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WHAT ELSE MIGHT WE ASK?: COMMENTARY ON FANTINO AND 
 STOLARZ-FANTINO’S “GAMBLING: SOMETIMES  
UNSEEMLY; NOT WHAT IT SEEMS” 
 
Iser G. DeLeon 
The Kennedy Krieger Institute and 
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine 
____________________ 
 
Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino have offered 
a highly informative summary of behavior 
analytic knowledge regarding problem gam-
bling.  As is sometimes the case with this sort 
of treatment, its greatest value might lie in 
making clear how much we do not know.  Be-
low, I follow their lead in discussing how be-
havior analytic considerations of problem 
gambling may be incomplete and suggesting 
additional, potentially fruitful, avenues of in-
quiry.   
 
ON THE RELEVANCE OF SUNK 
COSTS AND THE SALIENCE OF 
RISK INFORMATION 
Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino ask ―How 
salient are the contingencies in standard gam-
bling situations?‖ The implication is that 
making the prevailing contingencies more 
transparent may make behavior more optimal. 
This has clearly played out well in the au-
thors’ examinations of cost sunk-effects.  
Sunk-cost effects seem particularly relevant 
and, I think, cannot be overestimated in the 
current context. This particular form of irra-
tional behavior pervades the gambling culture 
and influences problem gambling on both 
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local and extended temporal scales. Individual 
bets are influenced by sunk costs (see below) 
and, in the longer run, self-statements such as 
―one more big bet can help me re-coup all 
those prior losses‖ are also a form of sunk-
cost effect.  The so-called ―gambler’s falla-
cy‖, a failure to understand or acknowledge 
that past failures or successes have no bearing 
on the probability of winning the next gam-
ble, is almost certainly related to sunk costs. 
Navarro and Fantino (2005) clearly suc-
ceeded in pointing towards promising direc-
tions for curtailing sunk-cost effects.  Still, as 
the current authors note, stimuli indicating 
risk are already ubiquitous in the gambling 
environment.  Informational strategies aimed 
at curtailing sunk-cost effects may be further 
questioned insofar as experienced gamblers 
have a keen self-awareness of this form of 
irrational behavior. This is perhaps illustrated 
by the elaborate vocabulary for such effects 
that exists in gambling culture. Poker players, 
for example, acknowledge being ―pot com-
mitted‖ to a hand—the poker player’s version 
of sunk cost. Similarly, being ―on tilt,‖ de-
scribes, among other things, an extended pe-
riod of emotionally infused irrational deci-
sion-making. That gamblers can already dis-
cern these features of their own behavior 
makes one question the benefits of supple-
mental stimuli that confirm its irrationality.   
Informational strategies further fail to ac-
knowledge other, possibly self-defeating, ef-
fects that such stimuli may have. A potential-
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ly relevant extrapolation from recent research 
is that reward-related stimuli, ironically, may 
decrease sensitivity to risk information.  Dit-
to, Pizarro, Epstein, Jacobson, and MacDo-
nald (2006) arranged two relative probabili-
ties of winning a pleasant experience (eating 
an unlimited number of cookies) versus an 
unpleasant task (completing problems for 30 
min). The gamble was made by choosing a 
card from a deck of 10.  For some subjects, 8 
cards resulted in cookies and 2 resulted in 
work (low-risk scenario); for others, 6 cards 
resulted in cookies and 4 resulted in work 
(higher-risk scenario). The dependent variable 
was simply what proportion of the subjects 
accepted the gamble.  When the cookies were 
simply described to subjects, they showed a 
rational sensitivity to risk information:  95% 
took the low-risk gamble, but only 45% ac-
cepted the high-risk gamble.  When visceral 
cues were provided (the students could see 
and smell the fresh-baked cookies), these dif-
ferences disappeared:  over 80% of students 
in both the low- and higher-risk group ac-
cepted the gamble.  In essence, the students’ 
behavior was less sensitive to risk information 
in the presence of those cues than in the ab-
sence of the cues.  Furthermore, the visceral 
cues altered the perceived likelihood of win-
ning.  Students rated their chances of winning 
the cookies to be better when the cues were 
present than when they were absent.   
If we can extrapolate to the current con-
text, stimuli that increase the salience of risk 
are themselves visceral (at least visual) cues, 
and/or are often embedded in contexts that 
provide further related stimulation. Where is 
the problem gambler likely to encounter risk 
information on betting on a given horse?  For 
some, the answer is at the race track amidst 
the sights, sounds, and yes, smells of horse 
racing.  This may help to account for Dixon, 
Jacobs, and Sanders’ (2006) finding that de-
layed rewards generally were discounted 
more steeply in a gambling environment than 
in a non-gambling environment. Context ap-
pears to matter.  Individual predispositions, 
however developed, to various forms of con-
text-driven arousal may also be relevant.  For 
example, sexually aroused college students, 
not surprisingly, reported a higher likelihood 
of engaging in risky sexual behavior than 
when they were not sexually aroused (Ariely 
& Lowenstein, 2006).    
 
ON THE RELEVANCE OF SELF-
CONTROL AND DISCOUNTING 
PARADIGMS 
Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino later ask, 
―What remains incomplete in any account of 
gambling based on discounting?‖ Discounting 
of delayed rewards is certainly relevant and 
essential differences in discounting patterns 
between pathological gamblers and others are 
informative.  Still, I agree with Fantino and 
Stolarz-Fantino that accounts based on differ-
ences in discounting functions may be incom-
plete or oversimplified.  How might behavior-
al discounting preparations, whether inter-
temporal or probabilistic, more fully capture 
important features of the real problem space? 
One issue is whether sooner-smaller vs. 
larger-later choices adequately take into ac-
count the actual consequences of poor choic-
es.  Larger, delayed outcomes are typically 
cast as greater magnitudes along the same qu-
alitative dimension, but aren’t delayed aver-
sive consequences more to the point when 
considering ―pathological impulsivity‖?  The 
suffering produced by the delayed aversive 
outcome of risky behavior is qualitatively dif-
ferent from foregoing the delayed potential 
gain.  For example, lighting a cigarette is 
sometimes cast as a choice between imme-
diate benefits of nicotine self-administration 
vs. the delayed benefits of a longer, healthier 
life. But losing out on a long life is not quite 
equivalent to suffering through lung cancer.  
Similarly, the delayed gains of larger amounts 
of money are very different from dealing with 
bankruptcy.  Self-control has, on occasion, 
been cast in terms of negative consequences 
2
Analysis of Gambling Behavior, Vol. 2 [2008], Art. 8
https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/agb/vol2/iss2/8
 WHAT ELSE 91 
 
(e.g., Deluty, 1978), but my point is that the 
positive and negative consequence versions 
are not necessarily equivalent. As Fantino and 
Stolarz-Fantino point out, aversion of risk is 
motivationally more potent than the promise 
of gain (as exemplified by the 50/50 chance 
of winning $200 vs. losing $100 experiment).  
In dealing with pathology, might we be closer 
to the point in arranging choices between 
small, immediate gains vs. large, delayed 
aversive consequences? 
In relation, typical self-control prepara-
tions fail to fully take into account dependen-
cies inherent in real-world choices.  Repeated 
impulsive choices do not simply displace the 
alternative rational options; they lessen the 
quality of the delayed consequences. The 
more frequently the impulsive choice is re-
peated, the greater the probability of the de-
layed aversive outcome.  Thus, more frequent 
decisions to light up that cigarette actually 
decreases the probability of a long, healthy 
life and/or increases the likelihood of lung 
cancer, heart disease, etc.  In dealing with pa-
thology, might we be closer to the point in 
arranging choices between small, immediate 
gains vs. delayed alternatives that worsen as a 
function of impulsive choices? 
Yes, many people gamble, but only some 
develop pathology.  Behavior analysts have 
examined different sensitivities between prob-
lem gamblers and others as a basis of address-
ing the problem. Temporal discounting is cer-
tainly a good start, as are observations that 
gamblers are less sensitive to changes in the 
probability of rewards (Holt, Green, and 
Myerson’s, 2003). Fantino and Stolarz-
Fantino have proposed a variety of potentially 
useful avenues for examining further differ-
ences:  Do problem gamblers evince the same 
degree of risk aversion?  Are gamblers more 
prone to be thinking about gambling?  Are 
problem gamblers more susceptible to gam-
bling related instructions or advertisement?  
My hope is that the above is informative in 
stimulating still others:  Are problem gam-
blers relatively less likely to understand that 
past failures have no bearing on future odds 
or are they simply more driven by other fac-
tors to ignore these relations? Are problem 
gamblers relatively less likely to attend to risk 
information—possibly an observing response 
issue? Are problem gamblers more sensitive 
to the effects of gambling-related visceral 
cues?  Do they become relatively more 
aroused by the outcomes, positive or negative, 
of their choices? Could there be benefit in 
casting self-control experiments in terms of 
small, immediate gains vs. delayed aversive 
consequences.  Are problem gamblers rela-
tively less sensitive to long-term aversive out-
comes than casual gamblers or non-gamblers? 
Most importantly, from a functional behavior 
analytic perspective, what sort of individual 
history impacts relative sensitivity to these 
variables?  Onward. 
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